Last Free Voice
overview of Groupthink, from Irving Janis.
Review other articles on vMEMEs and bias.
In 1972, Irving Janis, in his book Victims of Groupthink, added a new dimension to the study of group behavior and group dynamics when he described “groupthink” as:
“… a quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are involved in a cohesive in-group; when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative course of action… Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures.”
(Janis, 1972, p. 9)
That single work seems to have had an immediate and almost historic impact on the study of group behavior. Since the first publication of Victims of Groupthink, many researchers have been moved to study, to support, or to refute both Janis’s theories and the implications of groupthink. Whatever has motivated any of these people, one thing is clear; that single work has been the starting point for many, if not all of these studies, and research on this phenomenon uniformly refers to Janis as the originator of the concept of groupthink, as well as its definer.
Early in his book, Janis gives the following story as an example of groupthink:
“Twelve middle-class American men and women wanted to stop smoking, and attended weekly meetings at a clinic to discuss the problem. Early in the sessions, two people stood up and declared that cigarette smoking was an almost incurable addiction. The group agreed. The, one man stood up and said “I have stopped smoking and, with a little willpower, so can the rest of you.” Immediately, the other group members began to abuse him verbally, and the meeting ended in chaos. The following week, the dissident stood up again and said that he could not both attend all of the required meetings and stop smoking; so he had returned to smoking two packs of cigarettes as day. The other members welcomed him back into the fold with enthusiasm but no one mentioned that the original purpose of the group was to help each other stop [emphasis in original] smoking. Their new aim was maintaining the status quo at any cost.”
(Ibid, p. 9)
Janis illustrated his theories by using seven recent major historical events; five of which he labeled as fiascoes and the other two which he termed successes relating to the resultant outcomes of those events, based on the decisions that were made. He argued that the decision making processes in the five fiascoes were faulty, regardless of the outcomes, and, likewise, the decision-making processes used in the successes were effective, even if the events would have not turned out positively. He stresses that it is the processes used in a group’s decision-making that determines whether or not that group is a victim of groupthink and not the outcomes because bad-decision-making processes can result in good or successful results or outcomes, just as good decision-making processes can result in bad or unsuccessful results or outcomes. (Janis, fig. 10-1)
In his original work (Janis, 1972), Janis identified six major defects in the decision-making process which result I groupthink and which, in turn, result in poor quality decisions. In the 1982 edition (Janis, 1982), he added a seventh defect to his list. These seven defects are:
1.) Discussions are limited to only a few alternatives without surveying all possible alternatives;
2.) The originally preferred solution is not re-evaluated for non-obvious drawbacks or risks after its initial evaluation;
3.) Alternatives which are initially discarded are never re-evaluated for non-obvious gains;
4.) There is little or no attempt made to obtain information or advice from experts on alternative courses of action;
5.) Where advice IS presented, selective bias on the part of the members is used to evaluate that advice and, thus, they use information which supports the group’s preferences and ignore evidence which is counter to the group’s preference;
6.) Members fail to consider how groups external to the focal group might react and, therefore, fail to develop contingency plans for possible setbacks or failures; and
7.) There is a failure to consult all members regarding the objectives to be fulfilled and the values implicated by their choice.
(Janis, 1972, p. 10; Janis, 1982, pp. 9 – 10)
Janis then went on to identify several antecedent condition which are necessary for groupthink to exist, and which relate to structural faults of the organization and the decision-making context. The primary antecedent condition necessary for groupthink is a highly cohesive group. The secondary conditions (which relate to the organization’s structural faults) are:
1.) Insulation of the group;
2.) Lack of a tradition of impartial leadership;
3.) Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures; and
4.) Homogeneity of members’ social background and ideology.
The tertiary conditions (which relate to the decision-making context) are:
1.) High stress due to isolation of the group (usually for security reasons instituted because of perceived external threats);
2.) Low hope of a better solution than the leader’s; and
3.) Low self-esteem temporarily induced by the group members’ perceptions of:
A.) Recent Failures;
B.) Moral dilemmas; and
C.) Excessive difficulty in current decision-making.
Finally, Janis postulates that the existence of these conditions generates eight symptoms of groupthink, which were evident in the fiascoes studies and which serve as the primary means of identifying the occurrences of groupthink. These eight symptoms are:
1.) An illusion of invulnerability that is shared by most members, which creates excessive optimism and encourages the group to take extreme risks;
2.) Collective efforts to rationalize in order to discount warnings which might lead members to reconsider their assumptions before they recommit themselves to past policy decisions;
3.) An unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality, which makes the members inclined to ignore the ethical and moral consequences of their decisions;
4.) Stereotyped views of enemy leaders, usually considering them as too evil to warrant genuine attempts to negotiate, or as too stupid and / or too weak to counter whatever attempts are made to defeat their purposes;
5.) Directed pressure on any member who does not conform to the group’s norms, who express strong arguments against any of the group’s stereotypes, illusions, decisions, or commitments, thereby making it clear to all that this type of dissent is contrary to what is expected of all loyal members;
6.) Self-censorship of individual deviations from the apparent group consensus, reflecting each member’s inclination to minimize to him or herself the importance of his / her doubts and counter arguments;
7.) A shared illusion of unanimity concerning the judgments conforming to the majority view (partly resulting from self-censorship of deviations, and augmented by the false assumption that silence means consent); and
8.) The emergence of self-appointed mindguards – members who protect the group from adverse information that might shatter the group’s shared complacency about the effectiveness and morality of their decisions.
(Janis, 1972, pp. 197 – 198)